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Abstract. We describe the motivation for moving policy enforcement for access 
control down to the digital object level.  The reasons for this include handling of 
item-specific behaviors, adapting to evolution of digital objects, and permitting 
objects to move among repositories and portable devices.  We then describe our 
experiments that integrate the Fedora architecture for digital objects and reposi-
tories and the PoET implementation of security automata to effect such object-
centric policy enforcement. 
1   From Traditional Access Control to Flexible Policy Enforcement 
Access control in digital libraries must be scalable, flexible, and extensible – accom-
modating a wide range of objects and usage scenarios.  This stands in contrast to tradi-
tional access control models, which are limited to a relatively fixed set of operating 
system abstractions (e.g., files) and computing actions (e.g., read, write).  The limita-
tion of these models has motivated the programming language, operating systems, and 
security communities to develop alternative and richer methods, including an approach 
known as language-based security [1].  
 
The shortcomings of traditional access control schemes are particularly acute in digital 
libraries where idiosyncratic and complex digital objects are the norm rather than the 
exception.  Such objects may aggregate mixed content (e.g., text, images, audio), may 
be highly interactive (e.g., a distance learning module), or may be portable (e.g., an 
object that is disengaged from its “home ship” for use on a mobile device). A typical 
security model has been to allow/disallow access to particular objects by particular 
subjects using system-level enforcement mechanisms.  These mechanisms do not 
easily adapt to handle the wide range of scenarios pertinent to particular applications 
and complex objects.  Designed to express only a limited set of access control rules, 
such mechanisms are often constrained in their policy enforcement capabilities.  
 
In this work, we recognize a continuum of policy enforcement – ranging from reposi-
tory or system-centric to object-centric. This model accommodates general system-
wide requirements, such as those covered by standard access control mechanisms, 
along with more refined requirements that pertain to various types of content objects.  
This spectrum can be understood through the metaphor of a museum attempting to 
enforce a variety of policies to protect its assets.  In this hypothetical museum, a secu-
rity guard is employed to stand guard at the main entrance and make decisions about 
who can enter for what reasons.  The guard enforces some general rules of entry (e.g., 
people must have paid an entrance fee, people must check their bags in the cloak 
room), as well as policies that ensure the safety of the building (e.g., anyone carrying a 
weapon is denied entry).  The guard may permit access to private rooms (e.g., by 
providing a special pass), but once a person enters the room, the guard cannot control 
what the person does.  In terms of our continuum, the guard is a mechanism for en-
forcing museum-wide rules, typical of the system-centric end of our spectrum.   
 
Carrying our metaphor forward, what happens once people have passed through the 
main entrance?  We wouldn’t expect the guard to have the knowledge or ability to 
oversee specific activities that occur inside the many rooms of the museum.  Each 
room may have its own protocols, rules, and restrictions for specific behaviors.   Also, 
room-specific rules may evolve on a day-to-day basis, or they may address the occur-
rence of special events.   To be effective, the main guard would have to be omniscient 
and omnipresent, and equipped with all of the rules and tools for every unique situa-
tion.   
 
As a better alternative, the guard should delegate control to others who enforce room-
specific policies locally.  A special exhibition manager would be equipped to enforce 
policies unique to a particular exhibition room.  For example, she would monitor ac-
tivity, allowing (1) members of the general public to touch certain items if they wear a 
white glove, (2) scholars with proper credentials to gain entrance to a private alcove to 
see selected rare documents, and (3) curators to open display cases to insert or remove 
items.   Such policy enforcement is both object and context-specific.   
  
Access control in digital libraries presents a challenge similar to that of the museum.  
Digital libraries contain a rich array of digital objects for which they must provide 
secure enforcement of both general-purpose and context-specific policies.   This paper 
describes our work at Cornell to provide such secure policy enforcement. 
2   Research Context 
Our investigation of policy enforcement for digital libraries builds on and extends two 
ongoing research programs at Cornell: (1) distributed architectures for digital objects 
and repositories, and (2) enforceable security policies.   
 
In the Fedora project, we have demonstrated interoperability and extensibility for 
digital objects and repositories [2,3].  The main result of this work is a flexible digital 
object model – one that supports the aggregation of mixed digital content and the 
association of rich and customized behaviors with those aggregations.   For example, 
book objects have behavioral access points such as “Get Table of Contents” and “Get 
Page.” Multimedia learning objects have access points such as “Get Lesson Video.” 
While Fedora enables the creation of such customized access points on objects, it still 
provides for interoperability among varying objects.  Through a set of generic behav-
iors common to every digital object, Fedora enables clients to uniformly discover and 
invoke the customized, content-specific behaviors associated with the object.  
 
Having demonstrated content-specific and extensible behaviors for digital objects, our 
next goal is to devise an equally flexible access control scheme to support them.  The 
requirements for such a solution are:  
 
• Flexible policy definition: ability to define policies that are either general-purpose 
or specific to particular digital object behaviors 
• Highly secure enforcement:  policy enforcement mechanism must be based on 
well-grounded security techniques 
• Conducive to mobile code and mobile computing environment: policies must be 
enforced on any code that is obtained from the network.  Furthermore, policies and 
enforcement mechanisms must permit digital objects to move among repositories 
and to mobile devices. 
 
This paper describes an approach for fulfilling these requirements by applying and 
extending new work in language-based security.  Specifically, we are investigating the 
use of security automata for specifying access control policies that are flexible, fine-
grained, and enforceable [4].  This special class of automata can be used to model 
policies in the form of finite-state machines.  For example, using a state transition 
diagram, Figure 1 depicts an automaton for the policy “after viewing descriptive 
metadata, only Cornellians can access the Lesson 1 video (of a distance learning mod-
ule).”  
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Fig. 1. Simple Security Automata for a Lecture Object Policy 
 
Security policies modeled in this manner can be enforced by mechanisms that simulate 
an automaton.  Essentially the automaton will monitor the executions that occur in a 
target system (including application-level and object-level executions).  It will prevent 
the running of any executions that violate a system policy.  This approach is demon-
strated in Cornell’s Policy Enforcement Toolkit (PoET).  In PoET, security automata 
simulations are implemented as in-line reference monitors (IRM) for the Java envi-
ronment [5,6].  Through our experiments with PoET and Fedora, we have demon-
strated the power of IRM in providing flexible and secure access control for behavior-
ally-rich digital objects and repositories.  The details of the Fedora and PoET tech-
nologies will be described in Section 4. 
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Fig. 2. Policy Enforcement Continuum 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, our integration of the Fedora and PoET technologies can 
provide policy enforcement for a range of digital library scenarios.  We depict a policy 
enforcement continuum (from repository-centric to object-centric) where the dotted 
areas with “locks” indicate the access control target points.  On the left, a Fedora re-
pository enforces general-purpose policies over all its contained objects.  In the mid-
dle, a hybrid approach is used, where some policy enforcement occurs at the reposi-
tory, while some policies apply to individual digital objects.  At the right end of the 
continuum are digital objects that handle their own policy enforcement.  The experi-
ments we report on in this paper are those focused toward the object-centric end of the 
spectrum.  To demonstrate this object-centric approach to policy enforcement, we 
have designed the Policy-Carrying, Policy-Enforcing Digital Object.  The next section 
discusses the motivations for pushing policies and enforcement mechanisms into digi-
tal objects.   
3   Policy-Carrying, Policy-Enforcing (PCPE) Digital Objects  
Most digital libraries will employ a combination of repository-level and object-level 
policies. The following requirements indicate that the object-level end of the spectrum 
deserves special attention.   
3.1   Behavior-Oriented Policies 
Policy definition should be able to address the characteristics, behaviors, and usage 
scenarios of actual digital library objects - not just system abstractions such as files, 
directories, and operating system commands. Our Fedora work demonstrates a model 
whereby behaviors of digital objects correspond to behaviors “real-world” entities.  
These behaviors are implemented as methods that essentially hide the complexities of 
underlying data, structure, and file formats that are encapsulated in a digital object 
container.  Referring to our book example, methods such as “Get Table of Contents”, 
and “Get Page” provide access to content, whether a book is stored as a postscript file, 
or as a set of digital images.   
 
In Fedora, clients invoke such methods to obtain different "views" of digital objects.  
To control access to digital object content, we must be able to write policies that cor-
respond to these defined views.  In other words, the semantics of policies should paral-
lel the semantics of digital object behaviors.  This allows policy definition to be 
closely aligned with people’s understanding of their content, not of a computer system.   
3.2   Specificity vs. Generalization  
Although we may be able to identify certain repeatable "design patterns" for policies 
in digital libraries, we should recognize that particular combinations of these types of 
policies are often unique to particular objects.  This corresponds to the fact that digital 
resources are generic in some ways, but specialized in other ways.   
 
There are circumstances in which policies should be applied to digital objects in a 
generic manner.  Consider a repository that has a variety of digitized books and lec-
tures pertaining to computer science.   There may be a set of general-purpose policies 
pertaining to the collection as a whole.  An example of such a policy is:  “Cornellians 
with repository manager status can add and delete objects in the collection.”  This 
policy is quite coarse in nature, and applies equally to all objects in the repository 
regardless of their individual characteristics.  These policies are typically enforced by 
a repository-wide mechanism.  
 
However, repository-level policy enforcement becomes unworkable for policies that 
address the idiosyncratic nature of individual digital objects.  General-purpose en-
forcement mechanisms may not be expressive enough to support the variety of vari-
ables, conditions, and desired actions pertaining to particular content items.  As an 
example of such an item-specific policy, consider an object that provides access to a 
digitized lecture.  Table 1 outlines a plausible policy governing access to such an ob-
ject. 
Table 1:  Policy for Lecture Object “A” 
Policy Rules: 
• Only users who present Cornell credentials, or who pay a $5 fee, can 
access the HIGH-RESOLUTION VIDEO. 
• All Users can access SLIDES 1-10 without restriction. 
• Only users who present Cornell credentials can access SLIDES 11-20. 
• All users can access DESCRIPTIVE METADATA without restriction. 
 
Enforcement of such a policy requires a mechanism that can detect requests that corre-
spond to the access points specific to the lecture object, and ensure that the conditions 
of the policy are not violated.  Although one could attempt to extend repository-level 
mechanisms to deal with these kinds of policies, it is probable that the mechanism 
would eventually becomes awkward and overburdened as it tried to accommodate 
increasing numbers of customized policies.  Such object-specific policies are better 
dealt with in a modular fashion, and linked to the object and its individual access 
points, instead of a repository. 
3.3   Decentralized Policy Management  
We envision digital libraries with distributed responsibility for policy definition.  In 
this scenario, system managers implement and maintain policies to ensure security for 
entire repositories.  However, other information stewards have responsibility for defin-
ing and maintaining usage policies for sets of digital objects. As we move policy defi-
nition to the object level, we can delegate responsibility for policy management to 
agents who are very familiar with certain classes of objects, or who have a vested 
interest in managing certain collections.  
 
A critical component of such distributed policy definition is a high-level policy lan-
guage. There are a number of ongoing projects that are developing such languages, 
including Cornell’s PoET, the XrML initiative [7], and PolicyMaker [8]. From a digi-
tal library perspective, such languages must be intuitive and easy, so that authors and 
librarians can write policies tailored to particular digital objects, or groups of objects.   
3.4   Extensibility  
If we take extensibility as a key requirement for digital objects, we are presented with 
the challenge of evolving policies with the evolution of an object.  One of the advan-
tages of the Fedora architecture is the ability to enhance existing objects, over time, by 
endowing them with new behaviors.  Such behavior evolution is facilitated by the 
modular design of Fedora Digital Objects, and particularly by the use of "pluggable" 
mechanisms that can add or transform object behaviors.  The principle of modularity 
should be applied to policies and enforcement mechanisms as well.  When object 
behaviors or interfaces change, policies and enforcement mechanisms must easily 
adapt. Attempts to define and manage monolithic policies at the repository-wide level 
would likely be difficult, especially since we cannot anticipate ahead of time the man-
ner in which policies may need to be changed to support new object-level behaviors.   
3.5   Portability and Mobile Computing 
Portability of digital objects is important for a number of reasons.  First, fast and reli-
able access to objects at a global level often requires caching or mirroring.  Second, as 
we move from a world of fixed networks to one of mobile devices with intermittent 
connectivity (nomadic devices), we will increasingly confront issues of access to digi-
tal content that is copied out of the networked infrastructure.  In both cases, we would 
like digital objects to be secure in transit and to facilitate their own policy enforcement 
at their target destinations.  
4   Experiments: PCPE Digital Objects using Fedora and PoET  
Given the motivations just described, we devised set of experiments to demonstrate 
Policy Carrying, Policy-Enforcing (PCPE) Digital Objects.  In preparation for the 
experiments, we evolved the Fedora model to support an augmented Digital Object - 
one that carries its own policies within.  As mentioned earlier, the security automata 
approach provides significant flexibility for policy definition and enforcement, making 
it an appropriate technology for addressing the unique requirements of digital libraries.  
Thus, by extending Fedora, and applying Cornell’s PoET software, we have stretched 
the capabilities of our digital object architecture, and have simultaneously tested the 
flexibility of PoET against real-world requirements of the digital library community. 
A brief review of the both Fedora and PoET will help illuminate the PCPE experi-
ments.  
4.1   Technical Overview: Fedora  
Fedora is a modular architecture built on the principle that interoperability and exten-
sibility is best achieved by the clean separation of data, interfaces, and mechanisms 
[2,3].  A Fedora Repository provides a general-purpose management layer for Digital 
Objects.  In their simplest form, Digital Objects are containers that aggregate mime-
typed streams of data (e.g., digital images, XML files, metadata), known as 
DataStreams.   It should be noted that DataStreams can be references to external data - 
either disseminations of other Fedora Digital Objects, or service requests to remote 
data sources. These are known as ReferenceDataStreams, and are one way that Fedora 
enables the aggregation of distributed content.  Clients can interact with Fedora Digital 
Objects through a generic set of methods, known as the Primitive Disseminator.  
These methods can be thought of as the default API for Digital Objects, providing a 
well-defined open interface for all objects.  
 
In addition to behaving in a generic manner, Digital Objects must be able to mirror 
real-world entities by providing access methods that make an object behave in a con-
tent-specific manner.  For example, a natural behavior for a book would be “Get Table 
of Contents.”  Fedora allows the association of rich and extensible behaviors with 
Digital Objects by “plugging in” generic components known as Disseminators.  Each 
Disseminator will aggregate references to: (1) a formally defined behavior interface 
that defines a set of methods for a particular kind of digital library resource (e.g. Book 
interface, Lecture Browser interface), (2) an executable mechanism (i.e., a Servlet) 
that runs these methods, and (3) DataStreams the Servlet should use to fulfill specific 
method requests.  These interfaces and mechanisms are themselves disseminated by 
Digital Objects, laying the foundation for unlimited extensibility of the architecture.  
A major strength of the Fedora extensibility model is that clients can use the generic 
methods (of the default API) to discover and invoke content-specific methods defined 
on Disseminators.  The Digital Object facilitates the invocation of these extended 
methods, returning customized disseminations of content to the client.   
 
Figure 3 depicts a Digital Object that provides access to a multimedia lecture.  There 
are multiple DataStreams in the object’s core: a low-resolution video of a lecture.  
(Video-L); a high-resolution video (Video-H); a set of accompanying slides (Slide-1, 
Slide-2); and an XML file that encodes both synchronization and descriptive metadata.  
Two Disseminators define the access methods for this object.  One defines an inter-
face for experiencing the lecture, the other an interface for obtaining Dublin Core 
metadata.   Although it is not apparent in the diagram, each of these Disseminators 
references a Servlet  - a piece of java code that may be local to the repository, or may 
be a piece of mobile code.  Clients interact with the Digital Object through its generic 
API methods.  
 
Providing access control for these complex objects, without compromising flexibility 
and extensibility, presents a significant challenge.  Early Fedora designs specified 
Digital Objects with their own internal access control mechanisms, known as Access 
Managers.  The Access Manager was envisioned as a watchdog, overseeing the execu-
tion of all methods that could be invoked on a particular Digital Object.  The power 
and flexibility of the PoET software has made it possible for us implement the Access 
Manager abstraction using the sound underpinnings of security automata theory.  An 
overview of the PoET technology lays the groundwork for the rest of this section. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. A multimedia lecture represented as a Fedora Digital Object 
4.2   Technical Overview: Policy Enforcement Toolkit (PoET) 
PoET is an implementation of in-lined reference monitors (IRMs) for Java applica-
tions.  To review, IRMs can simulate security automata; as such, they can enforce a 
rich class of access control policies.  In general, a reference monitor enforces security 
policies by mediating all executions that pertain to the policy it is enforcing.  A refer-
ence monitor must be transparent to applications, and must be protected from attack 
by applications.  IRMs achieve this through bytecode modification by a trusted pro-
gram rewriter.   
 
In PoET, java applications are converted to secured applications by a code rewriter 
that embeds checks into Java Machine Language programs (bytecode).  An easy way 
to understand this is to imagine PoET "baking" the bytecode in such a manner that the 
policy becomes ingrained within it.  The embedded checks terminate forbidden execu-
tions before they violate the security policy for the application.  To ensure the integrity 
of the checks, and to increase performance of the modified code, PoET performs pro-
gram analysis and optimization during the rewriting process.   It should be noted that 
since PoET modifies bytecode - not Java source code - the Java compiler is not part of 
the trusted computing base.   It follows, then, that a computer running PoET does not 
require the presence of a Java compiler, nor Java source code for the application.   
 
In PoET, security policies are specified in the Policy Specification Language 
(PSLang), which is a simple, event-oriented language that is somewhat similar to Java 
in syntax. Policies that are modeled as security automata can be easily expressed in 
PSLang.  
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Figure 4 shows the process by which PoET creates a secure application.  First, PoET 
intakes both the policy to be enforced, and the code to be protected.  The PoET re-
writer decomposes bytecode (Java class files), embeds policy-checking code, performs 
integrity checks, and generates a modified versions of the class files.  All original 
functionality is preserved, but the resultant class files have the policy checks merged 
into them.  Finally, the PoET class loader transfers the modified code into the Java 
Virtual Machine (JVM) where it is run as a secured application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  PoET embeds a policy into Java bytecode 
4.3   Integration of Fedora and PoET 
Because the Fedora implementation is written as a Java application we were able to 
take full advantage PoET’s in-line reference monitoring.  The standard model for 
PoET is to statically embed policies into application code.  Since Digital Object be-
haviors may evolve, the policies that correspond to them must also evolve.   If policies 
are modified or extended, these changes must be immediately reflected in the execu-
tions of Fedora Digital Objects.  To ensure this, we enhanced PoET so that it now 
accepts and modifies pieces of Java bytecode on a “just-in-time” basis.  This was 
particularly important because Digital Objects often depend on shared pieces of mo-
bile code to execute behaviors. 
 
Fedora now associates a default policy with each Digital Object in a Repository. The 
default policy is a shared policy that any Digital Object can point to.  The default 
policy specifies access restrictions for the generic API methods common to all Digital 
Objects. Typically, repository managers will define a default policy that prevents end-
users from modifying the contents of Digital Objects, but allows users to browse and 
obtain disseminations from them.   
 
Additionally, Fedora now supports the association of one content-specific policy with 
each behavior interface (e.g., a book interface that includes a number of methods).  
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These policies can be customized to a particular Digital Object, or they can be “group 
policies” that any Digital Objects can associate with.  Customized policies are stored 
as DataStreams inside Digital Objects.  Group policies reside in the repository and are 
stored by reference in Digital Objects (i.e., stored as ReferenceDataStreams).  
 
To provide policy enforcement using in-line reference monitoring, Fedora interfaces 
with PoET.  In Fedora, extensible code modules (i.e., Servlets) are used to implement 
Digital Object behaviors.  Originally, Fedora’s Mechanism Manager obtained these 
code modules – either locally or from the network - and would load them into the 
JVM as needed.  As part of our integration, we adapted the Mechanism Manager to 
interface directly with PoET.  Now, whenever a Digital Object receives a request, the 
Mechanism Manager obtains the requisite code module and sends the appropriate 
policy and code to the PoET rewriter.  From there, PoET takes over to ensure the 
secure modification of the Java bytecode, and secure loading of the modified classes 
into the JVM. 
4.4   Experiment Results 
In collaboration with our library colleagues, we are designing policy enforcement 
experiments that address policy requirements for a range of object types and institu-
tional contexts.  In this paper, we report on our first set of experiments with Cornell's 
Computer Science lecture archive.  Figure 5 depicts a lecture packaged as a Fedora 
Digital Object secured with PoET's in-line reference monitoring. It should be noted 
that the diagram does not convey the fact that repository-wide policies are normally in 
place to prevent untrusted programs from compromising the host computing environ-
ment.  In the diagram, the Lecture Digital Object introduced earlier now contains two 
policies: (1) a policy pertaining to the Digital Object’s default API behaviors (labeled 
“Default Policy”), and (2) a customized policy pertaining to the behaviors of the Lec-
ture Disseminator (labeled “Policy-L”).  The default policy restricts access to opera-
tions that can modify the contents of the object.  The Lecture Disseminator policy 
(Policy-L) is a PSLang specification of the policy we saw earlier in Table 1.   Al-
though other lecture objects are structurally similar, they contain different content and 
different policies. 
 
In support of the object-centric view we have proposed herein, we have achieved three 
main results, namely the ability to: (1) write highly customized policies tailored to the 
specific nature of object content, (2) enforce radically different policies for different 
objects of the same type, and (3) dynamically apply policies to code modules (mobile 
java programs) that are shared by multiple objects, demonstrating that the same appli-
cation code can adapt to the policies pertaining to a particular run-time context.  
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Fig. 5.  "Lecture A" Digital Object with Restrictive Policies 
5   Discussion 
Object-centric policy management may have its drawbacks. Is it too hard to associate 
policies with every object?  It depends on the nature of the objects, how unique they 
are, and how uniform policies tend to be.  However, as noted earlier, repository-
centric policy management has serious scalability and extensibility issues.  Our future 
experiments will focus on the trade-offs of each.    
 
In addition, there are significant mobile computing challenges yet to be addressed with 
PCPE digital objects.  What if a digital object is taken out of its home repository and 
downloaded onto a mobile computing device?  Such objects have moved outside our 
trusted computing base. For such portable objects there is a level of assumption 
around the "receiving" environment.  First, the receiving environment must be able to 
interpret and "run" the digital object.  In our experiments, we assume the presence of a 
Java Virtual Machine and software capable of interpreting Fedora objects.  Even if 
policies are embedded within bytecode, an object may still be vulnerable.  A portable 
digital object must be tamper-proof.  In our Fedora/PoET implementation, a digital 
object that is disembodied from its home repository could be compromised by a savvy 
attacker who knows how to decompose and modify java bytecode in a manner that 
allows a policy to be bypassed.  Although this is a difficult maneuver, we believe that 
our PCPE digital objects should be supported by supplemental security measures - 
possibly the use of public key infrastructure or other trust schemes to support digital 
object mobility.  The digital objects should be secured containers, similar to that ap-
proach taken by IBM Cryptolopes [9]. Trust and security for mobile computing are 
active research areas that will be a continuing thread of inquiry in our digital library 
research. 
5.1   Future Work   
Under the auspices of Project Prism [10], we will continue to test increasingly com-
plex policy scenarios in collaboration with Cornell University Library.  One area of 
focus will be in contention between repository policies and digital object policies - 
how does the overlay or interaction of policies get resolved?  A particularly interesting 
line of future research will be in the area of "intentional" policies.  At this time, we 
have demonstrated the pre-defined binding of particular policies to particular digital 
objects.  In our future work we will study dynamic binding of policies to "virtual sub-
sets" of digital objects.  We look to dynamic rule-based policy binding where criteria 
can be established that set up the conditions in which objects should be subject to 
particular polices.  This would allow us to say at some arbitrary point in time that "all 
objects authored by Bill Arms are now subject to the provisions of Policy XYZ."    
5.2   Related Work 
The Smart Object Dumb Archive (SODA) architecture promotes a similar notion to 
our PCPE Digital Objects by pushing functionality into objects [11].  Although SODA 
objects may contain terms and conditions data, it is not clear whether these are ex-
pressed in a formal policy language, or what security techniques are used to enforce 
them.  Also, the SODA work does not specifically address issues of flexibility in pol-
icy expression and adaptability of enforcement mechanisms.   
 
Others have developed policy specification languages that can be used in conjunction 
with trust management systems.  Keynote [12] has its own policy language that is used 
in conjunction with the Keynote interpreter.  XrML [7] is an XML-based markup 
language for describing rights, fees, and terms for digital content.  XrML does not 
prescribe an enforcement mechanism, but a way to specify rights information so that 
various systems can read and interpret it.   Cornell’s PoET is an application of lan-
guage-based security.  There is no central trust server that grants or denies access.  
PoET’s policy language (PSLang) is optimized for use by a program rewriter that 
actually modifies application code (java bytecode) to ensure that policies are enforced.  
The modified programs will prevent executions that violate policy. Relative to other 
approaches, this technique is particularly useful in securing mobile code applications.   
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